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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether it was reasonable and necessary that the trial court 
deny plaintiff any right, title and interest in and to one-half of plaintiff's 
retirement. 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in denying plaintiff any 
right, title and interest in and to defendant's retirement when the Decree of 
Divorce was silent as to defendant's retirement. 
3. Whether plaintiff's right in and to one-half of defendant's 
retirement was barred by res judicata. 
4. Whether the plaintiff established a substantial change of 
circumstances which have occurred since the Decree of Divorce. 
5. Whether the trial court's memorandum decision adequately 
supports the award of alimony to the plaintiff and after considering those 
factors, whether the court abused its discretion in awarding alimony to the 
plaintiff. 
6. Whether the trial court correctly followed the purpose of 
alimony when alimony was awarded to the plaintiff and whether it was a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion to award alimony to the plaintiff. 
DETERMINATIVE ROLE: Otah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5 
The rule relevant to this appeal is as follows: 
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the distribution of property as is reasonable and necessary." 
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IN THE COOKF OF APPEALS, STATE OF OTAH 
GAIL KATHLEEN THEOCKMORTQN, 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No.: 870400-CA 
Category: 14b 
CROSS-APPEAL AND REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Gail Kathleen Throckmorton, commenced an action seeking 
modification of a Decree of Divorce dated September 13, 1976. The plaintiff 
sought to have the alimony adjusted from the sum of $1.00 per year to the sum 
of $500.00 per month. The plaintiff further sought one-half of defendant's 
retirement, an asset of the marital estate which was not distributed pursuant 
to the Decree of Divorce dated September 13, 1976- The matter was heard in the 
Third Judicial District Court on the 16th day of July 1987, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. . The court modified the Decree of Divorce 
specifically awarding the plaintiff the sum of $396.00 per month. The court 
denied any type of award to the plaintiff of defendant's retirement account. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married on or about May 27, 1955. (Tr. 
at 5). During the twenty-one year marriage, plaintiff and defendant had eight 
(3) children, all of which have reached majority. (Tr. at 6). In August of 
1976, a divorce complaint was filed and approximately one month later on 
September 13, 1976, the divorce was granted. (Tr. at 5). The divorce filed in 
1976 was precipitated by the defendant who wanted the divorce. (Tr. at 5). 
The plaintiff went to defendant's attorney whom defendant paid and pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce, plaintiff was awarded the care, custody and control of 
the eight (8) children of the marriage. (Tr. at 5). The plaintiff was further 
awarded, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the sum of $1.00 per year as 
alimony. (Tr. at 6). The Decree of Divorce was silent as to defendant's 
retirement with the Utah State Retirement Fund. The defendant had commenced 
working as a police office on November 17, 1958, and at the time the Decree of 
Divorce was granted, had approximately eighteen (18) years of service. (Tr. at 
5). The defendant retired on August 31, 1984 with approximately twenty six 
(26) years of service. (Tr. at 5). The defendant presently receives the sum 
of $1,580.00 per month and based on the actuary tables;, defendant will receive 
in excess of $500,000.00 if defendant should live to the age set forth on the 
actuary tables. (Tr. at 6). The plaintiff at the present time is unemployed, 
and has medical problems which include reactive absolute hyperglycemia, 
euthyroid, hyprometabolism, chronic angina secondary to coronary insufficiency, 
and fiberocystic disease of the breast. (Tr. at 6). Plaintiff's doctor has 
recommended open heart sungery but due to plaintiff's financial condition, 
plaintiff has been unable to afford the operation. (Tr. at 6). The plaintiff 
in 1985 made the sum of $500.00 which was used to help a son on a mission and 
support the other children which remained in the home. (Tr. at 6). 
SOMMftRY OF ARGUMENTS 
The order of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson which modified the 
Decree of Divorce should be reversed as to denying plaintiff an interest in and 
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to defendant's retirement and upheld as to the alimony increase awarded to the 
plaintiff on the following basis. 
1. The trial court having continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes to the Decree of Divorce as to the distribution of property 
should have granted to plaintiff one-half of defendant's retirement because it 
was reasonable and necessary. 
2- The Decree of Divorce should have been modified by the trial 
court granting to plaintiff one-half of defendant's retirement when the Decree 
of Divorce was silent as to defendant's retirement. 
3. The plaintiff's right to one-half of defendant's retirement 
should not have been barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata when the issue of 
defendant's retirement had never been tried or determined in any previous 
adjudication. 
4. The plaintiff established that there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The change 
in circumstances were as follows: (a) plaintiff has serious health problems 
including the need for open heart sungery; (b) the plaintiff is presently 
unemployed and due to her medical condition and is unable to work; (c) the 
children of the parties have all reached majority and defendant is no longer 
paying child support. 
5. The trial court's memorandum decision adequately supports the 
award of alimony to the plaintiff. The award of alimony was based on the 
plaintiff being unemployed, being unable to obtain gainful employment because 
of medical problems, and the defendant having retirement income of $18,970.00 
per year or $1,584.00 per month. 
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6. The trial court's award of alimony to the plaintiff was 
equitable and justified because it provided a means by which plaintiff can 
support herself and not become a ward of the state. 
ARGUMENT 
EQIHLI 
THE TRIAL CODET HAVING CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUBSEQUENT 
CHANGES OR NEW ORDERS AS TO DISTRIBUTION 
OF PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE GRANTED TO 
PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF OF DEFENDANT'S 
RETIEEMHff, THE SUBSEQUENT CHANGE 
BEING REASONABLE AND NECESSARY 
Pursuant to U.CA. Section 30-3-5 it states, 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for 
the.. .distribution of property as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
Applying the above statute to this case, it is clear the lower court 
had continuing jurisdiction to make new orders or changes as to the 
distribution of property as is reasonable and necessary. The Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, in regard to the above statute, has stated, 
"... Section 30-3-5 does authorize the divorce court 
to reallocate property rights between the parties 
to the divorce such as by modifying the earlier 
Decree." Sudouist v. Sudauist. 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1982). 
In Suctauist the Dtah Supreme Court found that in a divorce 
proceeding, the District Court had continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes with respect to the distribution of the parties interest in "then 
owned" property. The plaintiff and defendant in the present case at the time 
of the divorce, jointly owned an interest in defendant's retirement. The 
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plaintiff, was unaware that she was entitled to one-half of defendant's 
retirement account at the time of the divorce or at the time of the 
modification of the Decree of Divorce in 1980. It was only after defendant 
retired and commenced receiving retirement that plaintiff became aware that she 
was entitled to one-half of defendant's retirement. The plaintiff should have 
been entitled to one-half of defendant's retirement as of the date of divorce 
in 1978 because the retirement had been accumulated during the marriage and was 
an asset of the marital estate. The District Court therefore having continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders, should have found it 
fair and reasonable that plaintiff be entitled to one-half of defendant's 
retirement as of the date of the divorce and the Decree should have been 
modified accordingly. 
POINT II 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SHODLD HAVE BEEN 
MODIFIED GRANTING TO PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF 
OF DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT BECAUSE THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS SILEOT AS TO THE 
RETIREMENT OF DEFENDANT 
The Supreme Court has allowed for the modification of a divorce when 
the decree is silent in regard to an issue when the issue was not contemplated 
by the parties or the court at the time of the decree. See e.g. Thompson v. 
Thompson. 709 P. 2d 360 (Utah, 1985). In Thompson the wife sought a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce where the decree was totally silent as to 
a loan. The Otah Supreme Court found that where a decree is silent, and a 
matter was not contemplated by the parties, and a substantial change of 
circumstances has occurred, a party to a divorce may petition the court by way 
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of a modification to have the matter considered and resolved by the court. 
In the present case, the Decree of Divorce was totally silent as to 
the retirement of defendant and it was clearly not an issue that was 
contemplated by the parties or by the court. There has further been a 
substantial change of circumstances in that plaintiff has become medically 
unable to work and plaintiff only became aware of her right to defendant's 
retirement after working in the court system and being advised by a judge that 
she had the right to seek a portion of defendant's retirement. The decree 
being silent as to defendant's retirement and the retirement not being 
contemplated by the parties, and the substantial change of circumstance which 
have occurred should have required the court to grant to plaintiff one-half of 
defendant's retirement. 
EQIHLJII 
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO ONE-HALF OF 
DEFENDANTS RETIREMENT SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF RES JDDIGATA 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following, 
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res 
judicata as to those issues which were either tried 
and determined, or upon all issues which the party 
had a fair opportunity to present and have 
determined in the other proceeding. Jacobsen v. 
Jacobs, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985). 
As the above case states, an issue becomes res judicata when an 
issue is tried and determined or the parties had a fair opportunity to present 
the issue and have the issue determined. Applying this to the present case, 
plaintiff at no time had an opportunity to present the issue of defendant's 
retirement. Plaintiff's lack of knowledge or information as to her right to 
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one-half of defendant's retirement kept plaintiff frcan raising the issue at the 
time of the divorce and modification hearing. Plaintiff's right to one-half of 
defendant's retirement should not have been barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata when plaintiff did not have a previews opportunity to have the 
retirement issue determined. 
voim vr 
THE TRIAL COURT OOERBCTLY MODIFIED 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDING 
ALIMONY TO THE DEFENDANT IN THAT A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following as to the 
modification of a Decree of Divorce, 
A party who requests a modification of a divorce 
decree must initially show that a substantial 
change in the circumstances of at least one of the 
parties has occurred. E.g.. Lord v. Shaw. Utah, 
882 P.2d 853 (1984); Haslam v. Haslam. Utah, 657 
P„2d 757 (1982); Christensen v~ Christensen, supra. 
A relative change in the income and expenses of the 
parties, if comparatively significant, can amount 
to a substantial change in circumstances. Jeppson 
v. Jeppsonr 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). 
Applying the above Utah cases, plaintiff has established a 
substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
The substantial changes which have occurred are that plaintiff is suffering 
frcan serious medical problems including reactive absolute hyperglycemia, 
euthyroid, hyprometabolism, chronic angina secondary to coronary insufficiency, 
and fiberocystic disease of the breast, with the recommendation of her doctor 
for open heart surgery. Due to plaintiff's medical problems, plaintiff is 
presently unemployed and unable to work. The fact that plaintiff was 
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unemployed at the time of divorce and is presently unemployed should not be the 
determining factor as to a change of circumstances. The fact which should be 
considered is that at the time of the divorce plaintiff was capable of working 
and at the present time plaintiff is incapable of working. Further, at the 
time of the divorce, defendant was paying child support to the plaintiff and at 
the present time all eight children have reached majority and plaintiff is no 
longer receiving any type of support from the defendant. The substantial 
changes which have occurred since the divorce all appear to be permanent 
changes. The condition of plaintiff's health is not likely to improve, and 
therefore, plaintiff will not be capable of working. All eight children have 
reached majority terminating completely any type of support from defendant to 
plaintiff with the exception of the alimony awarded to plaintiff by the 
District Court. The plaintiff having been married to defendant for 
approximately twenty one years and the change of circumstances which have 
occurred since the Decree of Divorce are a sufficient basis by which to uphold 
the trial court's award of alimony to the plaintiff. 
POINTY 
THE MEMORANDUM OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE AWARD OF 
ALIMONY TO THE FLAIOTIFF 
The Utah Supreme Court in regard to spousal support has stated, 
In deciding whether or not to award spousal support 
and, if so, in what amount, the trial court must 
consider the financial condition and needs of the 
spouse claiming support, the ability of that spouse 
to provide sufficient income for him or herself, 
and the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
the support. Failure to consider these factors 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Faff el v. 
Eaffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986). 
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Applying the above case to the court's memorandum decision, it is 
clear that the court took into consideration all items set forth in Faff el. 
In paragraph 7 of its memorandum decision the court specifically 
dealt with the financial conditions and needs of the plaintiff and with the 
ability of the plaintiff to provide sufficient income for herself. The 
District Court found the plaintiff to be unemployed and unable to gain 
employment due to her physical condition. In paragraph 8 of its memorandum 
decision the District Court found defendant had the ability to provide support 
when it determined that defendant had yearly income of $18,970.00 per year and 
$1,584.00 per month. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
alimony to the plaintiff when the court took into consideration plaintiff's 
needs, plaintiff's ability to support herself, and defendant's ability to 
provide the support to plaintiff. 
POINT YI 
THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS EQUITABLE AND 
JUSTIFIED CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF'S 
PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION 
The Utah Appellate Court has stated the following as to the purpose 
of alimony. 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and 
to prevent the spouse from becoming a public 
chaise". Eames v. E$m$, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
App. 1987)(citing Paffel v. Pa£fel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 
(Utah 1986). This Court will not interfere with an 
award of alimony absent a showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id- Tallev v. 
TalleyT 739 P. 2d 836 (Utah App. 1987). 
As the above case states one of the purposes of alimony is that it 
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is a means by which to prevent a spouse from becoming a public charge. In the 
present case it is clear that the plaintiff will become a public chaise unless 
defendant is required to provide support to the plaintiff. 
As previously discussed plaintiff in 1985, earned approximately 
$500.00 and due to plaintiff's medical condition, plaintiff is unemployed and 
unable to work. If the trial court would have awarded no alimony to the 
plaintiff when the plaintiff's circumstances are as outlined, it would have 
clearly been a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The court's award of alimony 
to the plaintiff should be upheld in that the purpose of alimony was followed 
by the District Court and the support awarded provides a means by which 
plaintiff can support herself rather than become a public charge. 
coMausiow 
The order of the District Court should be reversed as to denying 
plaintiff an interest in and to defendant's retirement because the Decree of 
Divorce was silent as to retirement, the issue had not previously been 
determined in any prior adjudication, and the award of one-half of defendant's 
retirement is reasonable and necessary. The order as to the award of alimony 
should be upheld because of the substantial change of circumstances which have 
occurred since the Decree of Divorce, the financial needs of the plaintiff, the 
financial ability of the defendant to provide the support for plaintiff, and 
the need to keep the plaintiff from becoming a public charge. 
WHEREFORE, the Respondent respectfully requests this court to uphoxi 
the Order of the lower court wherein the alimony increase is awarded to the 
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plaintiff but reverse the Order of the lower court denying plaintiff an 
interest in and to defendant's retirement. 
DATED this ^ dav of r;^gU*«/>w "/• 1988. 
LLY SOEMITTED: 
NOLAN J. OLS] 
Attorney fori pondent 
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